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How are memories formed and how do they shape our understanding of the past, and in this case, history in particular? Maurice Halbwachs believes that memory is a social institution, a set of individual memories constructed out of personal experience but, more importantly, out of information learned from social groups of which people are a part of. Halbwachs raises a crucial debate in the field of memory studies that seeks to delineate and synthesize the relationship between individual and collective memory. Historians seek to examine the relationship between the two, and to explain how memories influence not only the way events are remembered collectively, but the way that histories are written.

David Blight’s Race and Reunion is a model work in this project. In this monograph, Blight traces the ways in which differing narratives about (or collective memories of) the Civil War competed to become the dominant national memory of the war’s events and aftermath, and eventually the dominant historical narrative (until historians in the 1960s began work to uncover forgotten narratives and competing memories). Adroitly, Blight demonstrates how individual memories shaped social memories to write the dominant narrative and then how, interestingly, these dominant narratives created a kind of cultural amnesia surrounding the role of African Americans and slavery in the war. Though reception is a tricky problem, Blight’s wide range of sources demonstrates a breadth of information defining how competing groups in post-Civil War America came together to shape the Lost Cause narrative of the Civil War. Blight’s book is an intriguing work of history as well as a thorough investigation into the way collective memories are formed. Though there is evidence of the role of individual memories in the narrative, it is not Blight’s project to demonstrate how collective memory shapes individual memory.

In this way, Blight is attempting to do the opposite of what Alison Landsberg does in her book Prosthetic Memory. Landsberg’s goal is to trace how collective memories can be transferred to individuals through the means of mass media so that their consiousnesses will be altered to create what she dubs “prosthetic memories.” For Landsberg, these memories are meant to inspire empathy in the receiver that will then allow this individual to take empathetic action not possible before the implanting of this memory. Landsberg’s argument is extremely provocative, but it raises many questions. For example, as raised in our discussion, what is the difference between memory and knowledge? Can an experiential museum like the Holocaust Museum really implant memories of the event in a person who has no previous experience of the Holocaust Museum, or is it simply imparting knowledge to the visitor? How can one “have” an experience that they have never actually experienced? And while Landsberg’s book is more a work of presentism, she provides no historical examples of this process being successfully carried out. There are problems of reception – she provides no proof through investigation of these supposed memory receivers that historical actors’ consciousnesses were actually changed. Whereas Blight’s book traces a demonstrable history, Landsberg’s only posits an interesting possibility with no proof of concept. She might argue that Halbwachs social groups have been transformed into mass media culture that helps shape the memories of previously disparate peoples, but even in Halbwachs’ formulation the individual must have individual memories with which to corroborate social memories. For Landsberg this is not so.

For me the most confounding work on collective memory which we read was Lipsitz’s Time Passages. Lipsitz argues that popular culture such as TV and rock and roll keep alive collective memories of groups who are not part of the hegemonic discourse, for example working class immigrants and African Americans. This idea of counter-narratives is provocative because it demonstrates how popular culture can be a dialectic. But it also raises the question: once these forms are synthesized into popular culture, don’t they lose their place as a counter-narrative? There is no work on reception – we hear nothing from cultural receivers about the way they processed the narrative of these cultural forms. And there is no work on cultural amnesia – how there forms may have their counter-narratives erased once they are absorbed into the mainstream. Demonstrating that popular culture can be a repository or reflection of collective memory is a valid project, but often gets lost in Lipsitz’s confusing and incomplete presentation.

This semester I’m taking two independent readings courses to satisfy the requirements of my minor fields. One of the courses, Popular Culture and Collective Memory, requires that I write reaction papers to my weekly readings and discussions. As a thought exercise, I will be posting them here.

When Walter Benjamin writes about the “Age of Mechanical Reproduction,” his argument about the usefulness of mass culture is not always initially clear. As I originally did, some read it as a lament about the loss of the aura of the authentic in regards to traditional cultural forms, i.e. paintings. But what Benjamin is really doing is marginalizing the function of the traditional cultural form in favor of new mass cultural forms. As Benjamin begins his essay, he writes in the Marxist tradition, and believes mass culture is the new vehicle which will help engender mass consciousness within the working class, who will experience class consciousness as a result of experiencing this mass culture.

The question then becomes: why didn’t this happen? It might be argued that mass culture was not prevalent enough in the 1930s at the time of Benjamin’s writing, and only now do we see a wide enough spread of mass cultural forms through processes like cultural globalization that might successfully engender a working class consciousness. But Benjamin does not address the problem of cultural hegemony as raised by Antonio Gramsci. Can class consciousness be raised if the masses are simply buying into the capitalist messages being fed to them by the capitalist cultural producers that they are embedding in their products, i.e. the star system of film, etc.?

Theodor Adorno takes a much more negative view of mass culture than Benjamin, who he is responding to directly. He believes mass culture is an instrument that keeps the masses passive, and that mass culture follows a set formula that is meant to do so. For him, traditional culture like art is an important way to express individualism, to challenge individuals in their thinking and to encourage them to actively engage with a cultural form instead of passively imbibing it (of which Benjamin would say the complete opposite).

How do these views of the advent of mass culture help us understand the study of mass and popular culture? How can we apply them to case studies of mass and popular culture, i.e. film and popular music? And as Gramsci and Lears, and also Levine inquire, how does this help us judge the content of mass and popular culture? Content matters, and though Adorno and Benjamin are fundamental theorists of the field, they do not really examine the content of mass and popular culture. Levine makes an important distinction when he calls for analyzing the content along the folkloric tradition to see how mass culture engenders both individual and collective consciousness. For him mass and popular culture are not supposed to lead to a revolution but instead reflect the way people think about themselves.

It is important for historians of popular culture to remember that popular culture is a dialectical process, not just a hegemony, in which “the masses” and cultural producers speak to one another through the process of consumption to help shape popular culture together. It is correct to say that people buy into dominant culture forms, but they help shape these dominant cultural forms because their consumption dictates the forms that popular culture takes. On the other hand, the range of choice is provided from those selected by cultural producers. In this way popular culture is a joint project.

As to whether or not popular culture is a revolutionary force, arguments can be made for both sides. High culture is important to challenging audiences and promoting individualism, but neither Adorno no Benjamin address the ways in which high culture can become mass or popular culture, i.e. myriad reproductions of the Mona Lisa. This capacity challenges the way we think of aura. Does a piece of artwork retain its aura if it is reproduced in this way? Does it remain both high and popular culture? We can see other mass apparatuses fermenting revolution, such as the internet and social media has during the Arab Spring, but what kind of consciousness are these movements engendering? Perhaps more importantly, are they successful? And are mass cultural forms like film playing a role in these revolutions?

As noted, the most important thing to take away from all of these readings is that mass/popular culture is a process. The masses and cultural producers speak to another other, just as audiences both engage with and receive cultural forms. Mass cultural forms are capable of producing new consciousnesses, but they are not always mass consciousnesses, and the mass consciousnesses can be passive or active. The individual can also take an active role in mass culture. And hegemony is not a static condition, it is also a process in which different groups exert control and individuals and masses find meaning.